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Abstract
A modern firm often employs multiple production technologies based
on distinct engineering principles, causing non-convexities in the firm’s
unit cost as a function of product quality. Extending the model of Mussa
and Rosen (1978), this paper investigates how a monopolist’s product
line design may crucially depend on the non-convexities in the unit cost
function. We show that the firm does not oﬀer those qualities where the
unit cost exceeds its convex envelope. Consequently, there are "gaps"
in its optimal quality choice. When the firm is only permitted to oﬀer a
limited number of quality levels (due to possible fixed costs associated with
oﬀering each quality), the optimal location of quality levels still lies within
those regions of the quality domain where the unit cost function coincides
with its convex envelope. We further show that the firm’s profit is a
supermodular function of its quality levels, and characterize a necessary
condition for the optimal quality location.
1 Introduction
In a familiar context of vertical diﬀerentiation, this paper examines how a mo-
nopolist firm’s product line design may be driven by its production technolo-
gies. In this market consumers have heterogeneous willingness to pay for qual-
ity, and the unit cost as a function of product quality is technology specific.
For a given production technology, the unit production cost tends to rise more
rapidly as quality increases, and an increasing, convex cost function eﬀectively
captures such decreasing returns. Nevertheless, firms in many product markets
frequently use multiple types of technology to produce the same generic kinds
of good. Based on a distinct engineering principle, each type of technology has
its own cost advantage with respect to a certain range of product performance
parameters. Even though the cost function for each individual technology may
be convex, the superposition of multiple convex technologies may lead to a situ-
ation where the minimum of the unit cost functions is not convex over the entire
quality domain. A central task of the current paper is to examine the eﬀects of
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the non-convexities in the firm’s unit cost function on its price discrimination
and product choice.
For example, currently ink-jet, laser, and dye sublimation are the three dom-
inant print technologies. The print head of an inkjet printer contains up to
hundreds of nozzles (each thinner than a human hair) through which tiny drops
of ink are propelled onto the paper, and resolution is determined by the number
and size of nozzles. A laser printer focuses a laser beam onto a photoelec-
tric belt, creating an electrical charge in areas where toner is to adhere. For
dye sublimation printers, the solid dye is vaporized into gas, which deposits
itself onto the directed areas of the media and solidifies. Ink-jet has the lowest
cost and is most suitable for low-to-intermediate qualities of black-and-white
printing. Laser printers require higher unit costs than ink-jet and are good for
high-end black-and-white printing. Dye sublimation is the most expensive but
provides the best quality, especially for color or photographic printing. Many
printer manufacturers install all three types of technologies to meet the demand
of customers with various quality requirements.
There exist many other examples of firms’ adopting multiple production
technologies. While digital machines have an edge in making products with rel-
atively high precision requirements, conventional analog machines are still more
eﬃcient in settings with low precision requirements. In markets where cus-
tom product features are valuable (e.g., application specific integrated circuits
(ASICs), apparel, and furniture), a firm may use flexible machines (e.g., FMS)
to make products with higher degrees of customization and use more dedicated
machines (e.g., assembly lines) for those with low degrees of customization. Like-
wise, LCD (Liquid Crystal Display) and CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) technologies
are more eﬃcient in generating digital displays with high and low degrees of
steadiness and clarity, respectively. Sutton (1998) provides additional vivid
empirical evidence on firms’ pursuing multiple "technological trajectories". In
addition, firms also add new technologies over time (due to capacity expansion
or technical progress), and therefore possess multiple "vintages" of technologies
(Arrow 1962). When the most recent know-how in production is incorporated
into the latest technology, each in the firm’s "fleet" of technologies may have
diﬀerent cost limitations with regard to certain product performance attributes.
To highlight the role of a non-convex unit cost function in a monopolist’s
product line design, we employ a modeling framework in which bunching does
not arise and both quality and consumer type are unidimensional. Each con-
sumer has a unitary demand and a quasi-linear Mussa-Rosen utility function,
i.e., the net utility is separable in quality and price, and each consumer has a
constant marginal utility of quality. To simplify the analysis, we further assume
that consumer types are uniformly distributed on the unit real interval. (How-
ever, see the comments on this assumption in Section 6.) The firm’s unit cost as
a function of quality may exhibit non-convexities, and consequently, there are
subintervals in the quality domain where the unit cost exceeds its convex en-
velope; such subintervals are called anomalous. Solving for the optimal pricing
procedure directly is complex, but we present a simple shortcut solution to the
firm’s problem. The crux of the analysis throughout this paper is to regard the
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convex envelope of the true unit cost as a "virtual" unit cost function. Clearly,
the maximum profit attainable with this "virtual" unit cost function is no less
than that attainable with the true unit cost function. The virtual unit cost
function is convex by construction, and is linear in the anomalous intervals.
We show that if the firm were able to produce according to this virtual unit
cost function, its optimal price schedule would be given by a simple formula,
and moreover the firm would not sell any quality in the intervals where the
virtual unit cost function is linear, and hence not in any anomalous interval
corresponding to the true unit cost function. That is, the firm would only sell
those qualities where the true unit cost equals its convex envelope. This implies
that the firm’s optimal profit with the true cost function equals that with the
virtual cost function. Therefore, the price schedule optimal for the virtual cost
function is also optimal for the true cost function.
We separately consider two cases according to whether the firm faces a con-
straint on the number of quality levels it may oﬀer. In the first case, the firm
is free to oﬀer as many quality levels as it wishes from an exogenously given
quality space, which may be either discrete or continuous. In this case we as-
sume that there is no fixed cost associated with oﬀering each quality level, as is
common in the literature. We show that the firm’s optimal price and product
policies have the same spirit for both discrete and continuous quality spaces. As
noted above, the optimal price policy is what it would be if the unit cost sched-
ule were the convex envelope of the firm’s true unit cost schedule. Thus there
may be "holes" in the firm’s optimal quality choice, since it oﬀers only those
quality levels where the unit cost schedule coincides with its convex envelope.
For a firm with multiple production technologies, the above result also speci-
fies the optimal utilization of each individual technology. Over time, the unit
production cost on some technologies may decrease due to technical progress or
process innovation. We show that cost reduction on one technology will reduce
the range of qualities produced using each of its neighboring technologies. In
our model, a technology may become obsolescent even when it still has a cost
advantage over some quality region.
In the second case, the firm is only permitted to oﬀer a limited number of
quality levels (e.g., because of fixed costs) from a continuous quality space, and
the firm has to decide where to locate these quality levels. Here again, we show
that none of the optimal quality levels is located in an anomalous subinterval.
The firm’s profit is a supermodular function of these quality levels. We concisely
characterize a necessary condition of the optimal quality levels, which has the
usual interpretation that the marginal cost of each quality equals its marginal
revenue.
When the consumer distribution is continuous and has positive density every-
where on its support, existing research has reached a standard conclusion that
the monopolist’s optimal quality choice is continuous, i.e., the optimal quality
assignment schedule does not jump as consumer type increases (see p. 310-311
of Mussa and Rosen 1978, and Proposition 6 of Rochet and Chone 1998). The
economic rationale oﬀered by Mussa and Rosen is that jumps in the quality as-
signment imply that the monopolist would not be able to fully exercise its power
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to discriminate among diﬀerent types of consumers. To the contrary, when the
unit cost function is nonconvex, the present paper indicates that jumps in the
quality assignment are necessary for maximizing the extent of price discrimina-
tion.
Some intuition for such a contrast may be found by examining the eﬃcient
quality allocation. Suppose each quality were made available at its unit cost. If
the unit cost function is strictly convex, then a consumer of a slightly higher type
would choose a slightly higher quality, and thus the eﬃcient quality allocation is
continuous. If the unit cost function has nonconvexities, however, no consumer
would choose a quality in an anomalous subinterval, and the eﬃcient quality
allocation necessarily has jumps. Our result may be extrapolated to shed light
on the nonlinear pricing literature as well, where the validity of the conclusion
that the optimal spectrum of quantities oﬀered by the monopolist is continuous
may also be sensitive to the cost specifications in their models.
Section 2 presents a brief literature review. Sections 3 and 4 derive the
optimal price and product policies when the firm’s exogenous quality space is
discrete and continuous, respectively. In Section 5, we analyze the optimal
location of a limited number of quality levels in a continuous quality domain.
Section 6 comments on the modeling assumptions and concludes.
2 Related Literature
Product line design by a monopolist has been studied by Mussa and Rosen
(1978), Gabszewicz et al (1986), Matthews and Moore (1987), and more re-
cently by Rochet and Chone (1998). The key contribution of Mussa and Rosen
(1978) is to realize that inducing diﬀerent consumers to purchase the same prod-
uct (also known as "incomplete sorting" or "bunching") may be optimal for the
monopolist, depending on the distribution of consumer types, and to design
an "ironing" procedure to address bunching. Gabszewicz et al (1986) examine
how a "natural" monopolist’s product line choice may critically depend on the
scope of the distribution of consumer income. The natural monopolist prices its
product line in a manner that keeps out potential entry, and its output is thus
fixed. Matthews and Moore (1987) extend the Mussa-Rosen analysis into a two
dimensional product space composed of both warranties and qualities (while
consumer types remain unidimensional), and surprisingly, they show that the
optimal quality assignment is not always monotonic in consumer type. Ro-
chet and Chone (1998) devise a "sweeping" procedure to deal with bunching
in multi-dimensional spaces of consumer types and product attributes. As we
can see, the focus of these articles is mainly on demand-side features such as
the distribution of consumer tastes (or income) in a uni- or multi- dimensional
space. However, they only adopt specific forms of unit cost functions and thus
do not fully consider the role of production in designing an optimal screening
procedure. The unit cost is an increasing, strictly convex function of quality
in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Rochet and Chone (1998), and is zero for all
qualities in Gabszewicz et al (1986). Shaked and Sutton (1983) consider a gen-
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eral production technology. However, they consider an oligopolistic setting and
their interest is to identify cost conditions under which only a limited number of
firms may survive at a Nash price equilibrium (a phenomenon they call "natural
oligopolies"). The unit cost of production is suppressed to zero in many other
competitive models of vertical diﬀerentiation such as Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982).
Closely related to product line design is another prominent stream of re-
search in the screening literature–nonlinear pricing (e.g. Mirman and Sibley
1980, Spence 1980, Maskin and Riley 1984, McAfee and McMillan 1988, Wilson
1993, and Armstrong 1996, Sibley and Srinagesh 1997), but there the authors’
main concern is still about inducing the right kind of consumer choice under
various demand conditions, rather than cost conditions, with most of the an-
alytical eﬀort devoted to tackling "bunching" and higher dimensional product
and consumer spaces.
3 Exogenous Finite Set of Qualities
Consider a monopolist firm that produces a service. The quality of the service
is scalar-valued, and the service can be provided at various levels of quality. Let
Q denote the exogenously given finite set of quality levels, sk, k = 0, ...,K.
Assume that s0 = 0, and (without loss of generality) that the qualities are
distinct and increasing in k. The marginal cost of providing a service of quality
sk is a constant ck, and there is no fixed cost. We assume that c0 = 0 and
ck > 0 for k > 0. Let c = (c0, c1, ..., cK). The firm charges a price, pk, per
unit of service of quality sk. A convention is that the zero-quality service, s0,
is oﬀered at p0 = 0.
We now turn to the model of demand. There is a continuum of consumers,
indexed by the real variable θ, uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. An
individual consumer either does not purchase, or purchases exactly one unit of
the service. If consumer θ purchases the service of quality sk at price pk, her
net utility is
U(sk, pk; θ) = θsk − pk. (1)
Note that this is the familiar Mussa-Rosen utility function, where θ measures
the consumer’s marginal valuation of quality. Given the price vector p, each
consumer chooses a quality level that maximizes her utility. To be definite, if a
consumer is indiﬀerent between any two quality levels, we assume that she will
choose the lower quality level. In particular, the purchase of s0 generates zero
utility, and thus represents not purchasing the service at all.
We next derive the demand for each quality level. Let R denote the set of
pairs (sk, pk) with sk in Q, let H 0 be the convex hull of R, and let L0 be the
lower boundary of H 0. Note that L0 is the graph of a convex function. For
any given consumer θ, her net utility function is linear in quality. Hence her
utility-maximizing quality-price pair must be in L0, and so any quality-price
pair in the interior of H 0 will not be chosen by any consumer. In fact, because
we have assumed that, among the pairs with highest utility she chooses the one
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with lowest quality, her optimal choice is an extreme point ("vertex") of H 0.
(A point of H 0 is extreme if it is not a nondegenerate convex combination of
two distinct points of H 0. Note that (s0, p0) is such an extreme point.) Besides,
since the highest value of θ is 1, any extreme point of L0 whose left-hand slope
of L0 exceeds 1 is not chosen by any consumer.
Define
dk =
pk+1 − pk
sk+1 − sk
, 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. (2)
The variables dk are the "slopes" of the price vector. Observe that all of the
points in R are in L0 if and only if dk is a nondecreasing function of k. Further-
more, for p1 ≥ 0 we need d0 ≥ 0. Hence the price vector p is called admissible
if it satisfies
p0 = 0, (3)
0 ≤ d0 ≤ ... ≤ dk ≤ ...dK−1 ≤ 1. (4)
For an admissible price vector p, it is straightforward that, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
consumer θ chooses (sk, pk) if and only if
dk−1 < θ ≤ dk.
Consumer θ chooses (s0, p0) if and only if
0 ≤ θ ≤ d0.
Finally, consumer θ chooses (sK , pK) if and only if
dK−1 < θ < 1.
Therefore, given the admissible price vector p, the demand for each quality
level is
D0(p) = d0,
Dk(p) = dk − dk−1, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, (5)
DK(p) = 1− dK−1.
Note that, for an admissible price vector and 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, the pair (sk, pk)
is an extreme point of L0- and hence demand for that quality level is strictly
positive - if and only if dk > dk−1. In addition, the demand for the K’th quality
level is strictly positive if and only if dK−1 < 1. The firm chooses the price
vector p to maximize his profit
P (p) =
X
k
(pk − ck)Dk(p). (6)
In what follows, it will be useful to express the profit formula in terms of
the variables dk, as done in Lemma 1 below. Define
gk =
ck+1 − ck
sk+1 − sk
, 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. (7)
These are the “slopes" of the cost vector. The cost vector c is called "quasi-
convex" if gk is nondecreasing in k.
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Lemma 1
P (p) =
K−1X
0
(sk+1 − sk)
£
−d2k + (1 + gk)dk
¤
− cK . (8)
The proof of Lemma 1 is relegated to the Appendix.
We are now in a position to characterize the firm’s optimal price vector. Let
H be the convex hull of the pairs (sk, ck), sk ∈ Q, let L be the lower boundary
of H, and let h be the function whose graph is L (see Figure 1). Call a quality
level sk anomalous if ck > h(sk). For instance, in Figure 1 u is an anomalous
quality but v is an extreme point of H.
Quality
s
Unit
cost
s
0
)(sh
Figure 1.
vu
Define the price vector π by
π0 = 0,
πk =
sk + h(sk)
2
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. (9)
Theorem 2 If, in addition to the above assumptions, cK < sK , then π is an
optimal price vector, and the monopolist only sells
Q∗ = {sk ∈ Q|ck = h(sk), gk−1 < gk, and gk−1 < 1}.
In particular, the demand for an anomalous quality level is zero.
Proof: Let Pc denote the maximum profit obtainable with the cost vector
c. With an abuse of notation, let h denote the vector with coordinates h(sk).
The plan of the proof is to show that if the true cost vector were h (instead
of c), then the firm’s maximum profit, Ph, would be at least as large as Pc,
and π would be an optimal price vector. We then show that in that case the
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demand for every anomalous quality level would be zero. Hence demand would
be positive only for quality levels such that h(sk) = ck, so that the profit Ph is
attainable with the cost vector c and price vector π.
Lemma 3 Pc ≤ Ph.
The proof of this lemma is given in the Appendix.
From (6), the firm’s profit from an admissible price vector p is
P (p) =
K−1X
1
(pk − ck)(dk − dk−1) + (pK − cK)(1− dK−1). (10)
Recall that for an admissible price vector the slopes, dk, must be nonde-
creasing. By Lemma 1, if we were to maximize the profit without the constraint
that the slopes be nondecreasing, the optimal values of the slopes would be
1 + gk
2
, (11)
and the corresponding prices would be πk. If the cost vector c is quasi-convex,
then the price slopes dk are nondecreasing, and the price vector π is admissible.
Hence, the conclusion of the theorem is verified in the case in which the cost
vector is quasi-convex.
In the general case, the vector h is quasi-convex, and so the price vector
π would be optimal if the cost vector were h. A maximal set of contiguous
anomalous quality levels will be called an anomalous region. If {sm, sm+1, ..., sn}
is an anomalous region, then h is linear on the interval [sm−1, sn+1], and hence
for the price vector π the slopes dm−1, ..., dn, are all equal. As noted above,
the demand for quality level sk is strictly positive if and only if dk > dk−1.
Hence, for the price vector that is optimal for the cost vector h, the demand
for an anomalous quality level is zero. It follows that, for the price vector that
is optimal for the cost vector h, demand for quality level sk is strictly positive
only if h(sk) = ck, gk−1 < gk and gk−1 < 1. Hence, by (10), the profit Ph is
attainable with the cost vector c, and so, by Lemma 3, Pc = Ph, and π is optimal
for the cost vector c, which completes the proof of the theorem. Q.E.D.
According to Theorem 2, demand is positive only for those quality levels sk
where (sk, ck) is an extreme point of L and where the cost slope gk−1 < 1.
4 Exogenous Interval of Qualities
In this section we characterize the monopolist firm’s optimal price and product
policy when the set of available quality levels is an interval, say Q = [0, b]. We
shall see that the results for this model are quite similar to those for the case of
a finite set of quality levels. The method of analysis is also similar, except that
we shall be dealing with an infinite-dimensional space of price functions, instead
of a finite-dimensional space of price vectors, so some extra machinery is needed.
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We also discuss the implications of the optimal product policy on technological
utilization when the monopolist employs multiple production technologies.
We first specify the production side of the model. The unit cost of producing
at quality level s is c(s), which is independent of the output level at quality s.
Again, there is no fixed cost. We assume that the unit cost function has the
following properties:
c is nonnegative and continuously twice-diﬀerentiable,
except at finitely many points (or none); (12)
c(0) = 0, c(b) < b. (13)
The behavior and distribution of consumers are as in the preceding section.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and if a consumer of type θ
purchases a quality level s at price p(s), then her net utility is
U(s, p(s); θ) = θs− p(s). (14)
Given the price function p, a consumer of type θ chooses a quality level that
maximizes her net utility. If the utility-maximizing quality level is not unique,
then she chooses the minimum such level. The firm’s price policy is a real-valued
function p on Q, which we assume satisfies the following conditions:
p is Lebesgue measurable, nonnegative, and nondecreasing. (15)
p(0) = 0, and p is continuous from the right. (16)
(The reason for requiring the measurability of the price function will become
apparent below.)
Adapting the notation of Section 3, for a given price function, p, let R denote
the graph of p in the quality-price plane, let H 0 denote the convex hull of R, and
let L
0
denote the lower boundary of H
0
As in Section 3, because of the linearity
of a consumer’s net utility in quality level and price, a quality level s such that
(s, p(s)) is in the interior of H
0
will not be purchased by any consumer. In fact,
again as in Section 3, quality levels such that (s, p(s)) is not an extreme point
of H
0
in L
0
will not be purchased by any consumer. Hence, without loss of
generality, we can confine our attention to price functions that are convex.
The following standard proposition about convex functions will be useful
(see, e.g., Royden, 1988, Prop. 17, pp. 113-114).
Proposition 4 If p is convex on [0, b], then it is absolutely continuous. Its
right-and left-hand derivatives exist at each point, and are equal to each other
except possibly on a countable set. The left- and right-hand derivatives are
monotone nondecreasing functions, and at each point the left-hand derivative is
less than or equal to the right-hand derivative.
In view of the Proposition, we shall make the convention that the derivative
of the price function, which we shall denote by F , is its right-hand derivative,
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and so it is continuous from the right. With this convention,
p(s) =
Z s
0
F (t)dt =
Z s
0
F (t−)dt, (17)
(where F (t−) denotes the left-hand derivative),
We next characterize the measure of the consumers who purchase a quality
not exceeding s. For the moment, fix a convex price function, say p, and let F
denote its derivative. Since p is convex, the net utility of consumer θ is concave
as a function of the quality level, s, and the derivative of her net utility function
at s is
θ − F (s).
There are three cases to consider. First, suppose that there is an interior s*
such that
F (s*−) ≤ θ ≤ F (s*),
and s* is the minimum of such values. Then the consumer will purchase s*,
provided
θs*− p(s*) > 0.
Second, if θ ≤ F (0); then the consumer will purchase quality level 0. Finally, if
F (b−) ≤ θ ≤ 1, then the consumer will purchase quality level b, provided
θb− p(b) > 0.
In this case, the mass of consumers purchasing quality level b is 1− F (b−).
A price function p is called admissible if it satisfies
p(0) = 0, F (0) ≥ 0, F (b) = 1, and (18)
F (s) is nondecreasing in s. (19)
The assumption that F (b) = 1 is only a convention, since it does not aﬀect
the price function, but with this convention the mass of consumers purchasing
quality level b is equal to F (b)− F (b−).
It now follows that, since θ is distributed uniformly on [0, 1], for an admissible
price function the measure of the set of consumers who purchase a quality level
not exceeding s is equal to F (s). Therefore, the firm’s profit is
P (p) =
Z b
0
[p(s)− c(s)]dF (s). (20)
[Cf. equation (6) of Section 3.]
Again, it will be useful to express the profit in terms of the function F .
Lemma 5
P (p) = V (F )− c(b), (21)
where
V (F ) ≡
Z b
0
©
−[F (s)]2 + [1 + c0(s)]F (s)]
ª
ds. (22)
10
The proof of Lemma 5 is given in the Appendix.
We can now characterize the firm’s optimal price and product policies. Let
H denote the convex hull of the graph of the cost function c, let L be the lower
boundary of H, and let h be the function whose graph is L. The function h will
be called the lower convex envelope of the cost function (see Figure 2). Call a
quality level s anomalous if h(s) < c(s). The properties of the cost function
assumed above imply that the anomalous quality levels constitute a finite set
of open intervals, which we shall call anomalous intervals. In Figure 2, (u, v) is
an anomalous interval.
Quality
s
Unit
cost
)(sc
b
s
0 vu
)(sh
Figure 2.
Define the price function π by
π(s) ≡ s+ h(s)
2
. (23)
Theorem 6 Under assumptions (12)-(13), π is an optimal price function for
the monopolist, and the monopolist sells only qualities in the set
Q∗ = {s ∈ Q|c(s) = h(s), c00(s) > 0, and c0(s) ≤ 1}. (24)
In particular, the demand for an anomalous quality is zero.
Proof: The proof mirrors that for the case of a finite set of qualities. First,
for any cost function f satisfying (12)-(13), define Pf to be the supremum of
the profit over the set of all admissible price functions. Clearly, Pf is bounded.
As in Section 3, since c(s) ≤ h(s) on [0, b], Pc ≤ Ph.
If the firm’s cost function were h (instead of c), its profit function would
be as given in Lemma 5 with the function c replaced with h, and pointwise
maximization of (22) would directly give the optimal F (s):
1 + h0(s)
2
,
11
and π would be the optimal price function. Notice, h is linear in the anomalous
intervals, and so is π. Consumer utilities are also linear in quality by assumption.
Therefore, given the price function π, the demand for each anomalous quality
level (where c(s) > h(s)) is zero, and demand is positive only where h(s) = c(s),
c00(s) > 0, and c0(s) < 1. By (20), the profit Ph is thus attainable with the cost
function c and price function π, i.e., Pc = Ph. Therefore π must be optimal for
the cost function c. Q.E.D.
A striking implication of Theorem 6 is that, when the unit cost is not convex,
the monopolist’s optimal quality choice may not be a continuous interval in the
quality domain. In particular, if there are multiple anomalous intervals given
the unit cost function, then the monopolist will skip oﬀering these anomalous
intervals. This contrasts with the existing result that the quality choice of a
monopolist with a convex cost function is a continuous spectrum(Mussa and
Rosen 1978, and Rochet and Chone 1998). Perhaps more importantly, Theo-
rem 6 lays the foundation for understanding the behavior of a firm employing
multiple convex production technologies, which we turn to next.
Corollary 7 Suppose the monopolist employs I production technologies, and
the unit cost function under technology i is ci, where ci(s) > 0, c00i (s) > 0 on
[0, b]. Then its optimal quality choice is
Q∗ =
[
[uk, vk], (25)
such that ci(s) = h(s) and c0i(s) ≤ 1 on [uk, vk] for some 1 ≤ i ≤ I, where h is
the lower convex envelope of
c(s) = min{ci(s), i = 1, ..., I}.
The proof is immediate in light of Theorem 6 and hence is omitted. This
corollary specifies how each production technology of the monopolist should be
utilized: The firm should use technology i to produce those quality intervals
[uk, vk] where ci(s) = h(s). Therefore, technology i is actively utilized only if
there exists at least one nondegenerate such interval [uk, vk], and is called obso-
lescent otherwise. Note that, in our model a technology may become obsolescent
even if it still possesses a cost advantage over certain quality levels; this happens
for technology i if c(s) > h(s) holds where c(s) = ci(s).
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Corollary 7 allows useful dynamic interpretations, even though it is obtained
in a static model. Over time, the unit costs under some production technolo-
gies are likely to fall, due to either external technical improvements or in-house
cost-reduction initiatives such as process innovation. While some articles have
argued that the firm should oﬀer new brands as consumer tastes change (e.g.,
Schmalensee 1978, Jovanovic and Rob 1989), Corollary 7 suggests that, as its
production technologies change, the firm should also adjust its product line
accordingly. In particular, cost reduction on one technology usually leads to
reduced utilization of the adjacent active technologies in the sense that the
quality spectrums produced using these adjacent technologies will become nar-
rower. Cost reduction on one technology may even render a formerly active
technology obsolescent. As shown in Figure 3, technology B was used to pro-
duce qualities [u, v] before the cost reduction on technology C, but becomes
obsolescent afterwards.
5 Endogenous Choice of Product Qualities
So far we have considered which quality levels the firm should oﬀer from an
exogenously given (discrete or continuous) set of qualities. Consistent with
much of the literature, the preceding analysis ignores those factors that may
limit the number of quality levels the firm oﬀers (other than the quality set
itself), such as any likely fixed costs required for oﬀering each quality. In this
Section, we shall take such factors into account, and examine the firm’s quality
choice when it can oﬀer only a limited number of qualities.
The basic setting remains the same as in Section 4, except that we require
the unit cost c(s) to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the quality domain
Q = [0, b]. However, the firm now faces a “variety constraint" and we assume
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that it can oﬀer only finitely many quality levels, say N . The firm locates
these N quality levels in [0, b] to maximize profit. To simplify the analysis,
assume that the firm would sell more than N quality levels without the variety
constraint (in the spirit of Section 4). Consequently, for the optimal location of
N quality levels, none is degenerate.
We have seen that, absent the variety constraint, the firm would never oﬀer a
quality level in an anomalous interval (Theorem 6). As the next theorem shows,
this conclusion continues to hold even when the variety constraint is present,
although this does not follow directly from the previous results.
Theorem 8 Suppose s∗ = (s∗1..., s
∗
N ) (0 ≤ s∗1 < s∗2 < ... < s∗N ≤ b) is an
optimal vector of quality levels. Then none of the qualities s∗n is in the interior
of an anomalous interval.
Proof. The proof is based on two Lemmas. The first is an analogue of
Lemma 3 of Section 3, which we state without proof. For any unit-cost function
f on [0, b], define
Pf = the maximum profit from locating N quality levels in [0, b].
Recall that h is the lower convex envelope of the cost function c.
Lemma 9
Pc ≤ Ph. (26)
Since we assume that c is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, h is convex
on [0, b] and twice continuously diﬀerentiable except possibly at finitely many
points. As before, there exist a finite number of anomalous quality intervals,
where h is linear.
Lemma 10 Suppose that the true cost function equals h, and that h is linear
on a interval [u, v] of [0, b]. Then for the optimal (for h) location of N quality
levels, no quality level will be in the open interval (u, v).
Proof of Lemma. Consider a quality vector s = (s1, ..., sN ). By Theorem
2 in Section 3, when the cost function h is convex, the optimal price vector is
p = (p1, ..., pN ), where
pn =
sn + h(sn)
2
.
Therefore, the profit from the quality vector s can be expressed as
P (s) =
1
4
NX
n=1
(sn − h(sn)) (en+1 − en) , (27)
where s0 = h(s0) = 0, eN+1 = 1, and
en =
h(sn)− h(sn−1)
sn − sn−1
, 1 ≤ n ≤ N.
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We can verify that
∂P
∂sn
=
1
4
e2n+1 −
1
4
e2n −
1
2
h0(sn) (en+1 − en) , 1 ≤ n ≤ N,
∂2P
∂s2n
=
1
2(sn+1 − sn)
(en+1 − h0(sn))2 +
1
2(sn − sn−1)
(h0(sn)− en)2
−1
2
h00(sn) (en+1 − en) ,
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, and
∂2P
∂s2N
=
1
2(sN − sN−1)
(h0(sN )− eN )2 −
1
2
h00(sN ) (1− eN ) .
For sn located in (u, v), we have h00(sn) = 0, and thus
∂2P
∂s2n
> 0.
Therefore locating sn in (u, v) cannot be optimal. This completes the proof of
the lemma.
The remainder of the proof mirrors that of Theorem 2, and is omitted.
Q.E.D.
According to Theorem 8, the optimal quality levels must be located in the
regions where the unit cost function c(s) coincides with its convex envelope h(s).
Therefore, Theorem 8 essentially converts the problem of locating N qualities
for the true cost function c into one of locating them for its convex envelope h,
as stated in (27).
The next Theorem shows that the firm’s profit is a supermodular function of
the quality levels. When the firm employs multiple production technologies, the
supermodularity of P has an interesting interpretation. Technological progress
such as process innovation is likely to lower the unit cost in a certain region of
the quality domain, thus causing some quality level(s) located in that region to
rise. If so, then the location of the remaining quality levels will also increase,
even though the unit cost function stays unchanged in the regions where these
remaining quality levels are located.
Theorem 11 The profit function P in (27) is supermodular.
Proof: Since the unit cost c is twice continuously diﬀerentiable (by assump-
tion), P is also twice continuously diﬀerentiable. We only need to show that
∂2P
∂sn∂sm
≥ 0,
15
for n 6= m (Topkis 1978, Milgrom and Roberts 1990). We can readily verify
that
∂2P
∂sn∂sn+1
=
1
2(sn+1 − sn)
(en+1 − h0(sn)) (h0(sn+1)− en+1)
≥ 0,
(where en+1 − h0(sn) ≥ 0 and h0(sn+1)− en+1 ≥ 0 since h is convex,) and that
∂2P
∂sn∂sm
= 0,
for |n−m| ≥ 2. Q.E.D.
Because the true cost function c may demonstrate non-convexities (which is
the central concern of this paper), h is linear where c(s) > h(s). From the proof
of Lemma 10 above, the second derivative of the profit function with respect to
each quality is positive wherever h is linear. Therefore, the firm’s profit function
is not concave in general.
The nonconcavity of the profit function is most clearly seen in the following
example. Consider the simplest case of locating one quality level, i.e., N = 1.
Let b = 2, i.e., the quality domain is [0, 2]. Consider a unit cost function with
the following lower convex envelope
h(s) =



0.35s2 in [0, 1],
0.7s− 0.35 in [1, 1.5],
0.1s2 + 0.4s− 0.125 in [1.5, 2].
.
The firm’s profit function is
P (s) =
1
4
(s− h(s))(1− h(s)
s
).
It is easily verified that P 00(s) is negative in [0, 1], positive in [1, 1.5], and neg-
ative in [1.5, 2]. In addition, P 0(1) < 0, P 0(1.5) > 0, and P 0(2) < 0. Therefore
P (s) has two peaks in [0, 2].
Even though the firm’s profit function is not concave for a non-convex unit
cost function, a profit-maximizing quality vector always exists because the profit
function is continuous on the finite interval [0, b].
We note that the maximum profit obtainable with N qualities is bounded
above by the profit when the firm faces no constraint on the number of quality
levels it may oﬀer, which is derived in Section 4.
The following Theorem identifies a necessary condition for the optimal qual-
ity levels, and the respective conditions under which corner and interior solutions
obtain for the highest quality sN .
Theorem 12 A). If
h0(s) ≤ 1
2
µ
1 +
h(s)
s
¶
, 0 ≤ s ≤ b,
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then s∗N = b and the remaining optimal qualities satisfy
h0(s∗n) =
1
2
µ
h(s∗n+1)− h(s∗n)
sn+1 − sn
+
h(s∗n)− h(s∗n−1)
sn − sn−1
¶
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, and s∗0 = h(0) = 0.
B). If
h
0
(b) >
1
2
µ
1 +
h(b)
b
¶
,
then s∗N < b and the optimal qualities satisfy
h0(s∗N ) =
1
2
µ
1 +
h(s∗N )− h(s∗N−1)
sN − sN−1
¶
,
h0(s∗n) =
1
2
µ
h(s∗n+1)− h(s∗n)
sn+1 − sn
+
h(s∗n)− h(s∗n−1)
sn − sn−1
¶
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1.
The proof is given in the Appendix. In Theorem 12, the LHS of the equation
for quality level sn is the marginal cost, and the RHS is the average marginal
utility gain of its buyers. Each equation thus has the usual interpretation that
the marginal cost of each quality equals its marginal revenue.
6 Concluding Remarks
Clearly, the optimal screening procedure and product line choice of a monopo-
list are jointly determined by both demand and supply side factors. While prior
research has emphasized demand-side factors such as the consumer preference
distribution and multi-dimensional contexts, this paper highlights the eﬀect of
unit production costs on price discrimination. A core result is that the mo-
nopolist should avoid oﬀering those quality levels where the unit cost function
exceeds its lower convex envelope. In what follows, we discuss the robustness of
this result in light of the various assumptions used in our model.
From Sections 3 and 4, we see that this result does not rely on whether
the firm’s quality space is discrete or continuous. In Section 4, we assume
that the cost function is smooth except at (at most) finitely many points. The
smoothness assumption facilitates exposition but does not appear essential. In
fact, our result holds for some cost functions with kinks or jumps, as long as
the number of such kinks or jumps is finite. For instance, the analysis of the
case of a step cost function can be accomodated by a straightforward extension
of the argument in Section 3.
We have assumed that consumer types are uniformly distributed. Our ex-
plorations indicate that the core result holds for a more general class of distrib-
utions, as long as a familiar hazard rate condition is satisfied so that bunching
does not arise.
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Finally, we admit that our core result relies on the linearity of consumer util-
ities. It would be interesting to consider how a nonlinear utility function would
aﬀect our current results. Nevertheless, such a direction would tremendously
complicate the analysis. Largely due to the same reason, a majority of the pre-
vious articles (e.g. Mussa and Rosen 1978, Gabszewicz et al. 1986, Rochet and
Chone 1998) have also employed such linear forms.
7 Appendix
Lemma 1.
P (p) =
K−1X
0
(sk+1 − sk)
£
−d2k + (1 + gk)dk
¤
− cK .
Proof : Let
xk = pk − ck.
With this notation, (6) becomes
P (p) =
K−1X
1
xk(dk − dk−1) + xK(1− dK−1).
By a rearrangement of terms, one has
K−1X
1
xk(dk − dk−1) =
K−2X
0
(xk − xk+1)dk + xK−1dK−1.
(This is an analogue for finite sums of "integration by parts." ) Hence
P (p) = −
K−1X
0
(xk+1 − xk)dk + pK − cK .
Observe that
(xk − xk+1) = −(sk+1 − sk)dk − (ck − ck+1),
pK =
K−1X
0
(sk+1 − sk)dk.
These, together with the preceding equation for the profit, lead immediately to
the conclusion of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. Pc ≤ Ph.
Proof: For any cost vector f , let P (p, f) denote the profit from a price
vector p, as given by equation (6). Since c ≥ h, it follows from (6) that P (p, c) ≤
P (p, h), and so
P (p, c) ≤ max
p0
P (p0, h) = Ph.
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Since this last inequality holds for all p, it follows that
Pc = maxp
P (p, c) ≤ Ph.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 5.
P (p) = V (F )− c(b),
where
V (F ) ≡
Z b
0
©
−[F (s)]2 + [1 + c0(s)]F (s)]
ª
ds.
Proof: Applying integration by parts to (19), we get
P (p) = −
Z b
0
[p0(s)− c0(s)]F (s)ds+ [p(b)− c(b)]F (b)− [p(0)− c(0)]F (0).
However,
p0(s) = F (s),
F (b) = 1,
p(0) = c(0) = 0,
and
p(b) =
Z b
0
F (s)ds.
Hence the firm’s profit from the admissible price function p is
P (p) = −
Z b
0
[F (s)− c0(s)]dF (s) +
Z b
0
F (s)ds− c(b)
=
Z b
0
©
−[F (s)]2 + [1 + c0(s)]F (s)]
ª
ds− c(b) (28)
= V (F )− c(b),
where
V (F ) ≡
Z b
0
©
−[F (s)]2 + [1 + c0(s)]F (s)]
ª
ds.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 12. A). If
h0(s) ≤ 1
2
µ
1 +
h(s)
s
¶
, 0 ≤ s ≤ b,
then s∗N = b and the remaining optimal qualities satisfy
h0(s∗n) =
1
2
µ
h(s∗n+1)− h(s∗n)
sn+1 − sn
+
h(s∗n)− h(s∗n−1)
sn − sn−1
¶
,
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for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, and s∗0 = h(0) = 0.
B). If
h
0
(b) >
1
2
µ
1 +
h(b)
b
¶
,
then s∗N < b and the optimal qualities satisfy
h0(s∗N ) =
1
2
µ
1 +
h(s∗N )− h(s∗N−1)
sN − sN−1
¶
,
h0(s∗n) =
1
2
µ
h(s∗n+1)− h(s∗n)
sn+1 − sn
+
h(s∗n)− h(s∗n−1)
sn − sn−1
¶
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1.
Proof: A). We can verify that
∂P
∂sN
=
1
4
µ
1− h(sN )− h(sN−1)
sN − sN−1
¶µ
1 +
h(sN )− h(sN−1)
sN − sN−1
− 2h0(sN )
¶
,
By Theorem 2, the cost slope at each quality must be less than 1, and so
1− h(sN )− h(sN−1)
sN − sN−1
> 0.
When
h0(s) ≤ 1
2
µ
1 +
h(s)
s
¶
holds on [0, b], we have
1 +
h(sN )− h(sN−1)
sN − sN−1
− 2h0(sN ) > 0,
and so
∂P
∂sN
> 0,
which implies that corner solution is optimal for the highest quality (s∗N =
b). The property of the remaining quality levels follows from rearranging the
respective first-order necessary conditions.
B). When
h0(b) >
1
2
µ
1 +
h(b)
b
¶
holds, we have
∂P
∂sN
|sN=b < 0.
Therefore a corner solution can never be optimal for the highest quality
(s∗N < b). As in part A), the property of the optimal quality levels follows
directly from the first order conditions. Q.E.D.
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